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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
Women, Security, and the Patriarchy of
Internationalized Transitional Justice
Fionnuala NiAol.in*
ABSTRACT
In the contemporary global context, transitions from conflict to peace and
from authoritarian to democratic governance are a critical preoccupation
of many states. In these contexts, accountability for the abuses committed
by prior regimes has been a priority for international institutions, states, and
new governments. Nonetheless, transitional justice goals have expanded to
include a broad range of structural reforms in multiple spheres. Whether
an expanded or contracted transitional justice paradigm is used to define
the perimeters of change, gender concerns have been markedly absent
across jurisdictions experiencing transformation. This article examines the
conceptualization of and legal provision for gender security and its sub-
sequent effects upon accountability in times of transition, with particular
reference to post-conflict societies. The article closely assesses a range of
contemporary issues implicated for women including an examination of
post-conflict security from a gender perspective, gender and disarmament,
and the centrality and effect of security sector reform for women. The ar-
ticle pays particular attention to the under-theorized and under-researched
role of international masculinities, and the patriarchy that is imported with
international oversight of transitional societies.
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[T]here are direct links between violence and conflict with the way that man-
hoods or masculinities are constructed.1
When women are afraid to go out in the street, they can't take advantage of the
theoretical freedoms that are now available to them?
I. INTRODUCTION
Transitional justice is an unavoidable feature of contemporary political and
legal discourse, from the international criminal trials spawned by the conflict
in the Balkans to the hybrid version of international-local justice meted out in
Iraq to Saddam Hussein. Its proponents are many, and its detractors (though
not as numerous) are equally vociferous. Those who articulate the value of
transitional justice discourse maintain its primacy and relevance to vexing
quandaries, including the most appropriate means to respond to grievous
and systematic human rights violations by prior regimes, and by what best
means to bridge the gap between the legal imperative of accountability and
the political pragmatics of governance. Detractors demur at the tradeoffs
and question the outcomes generated by transitional accountability. In both
accounts this article suggests that an analytical piece has been (with some
notable exceptions) missing-namely, that the processes, institutions, and
values that drive change in transitional society are deeply gendered.3
In almost all contexts where transitional justice is a contemporary politi-
cal reality, the focus primarily lies with mechanisms of legal accountability,
whether formal (trials) or less formal (truth commissions). Here the experi-
ences and needs of women are markedly absent or silenced by the general
discourse of accounting for the past.4 Moreover, and critical to understanding
such silencing, one cannot evaluate the credibility and value of account-
ability mechanisms for women in times of transition without an eye to the
broader transitional dynamic of the society in question. In particular, by not
assessing the structures and modalities of change that create and enforce
exclusion for women in post-conflict and post-repression contexts, we fail to
effect meaningful political and legal transformation for women in situations
1. Gary Barker & Christine Ricardo, Young Men and the Construction of Masculinity in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for HIV/AIDS, Conflict, and Violence, 26 CONFLICT
PREVENTION & RECONSTRUCTION 24 (2005).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "KILLING You is A VERY EASY THING FOR US": HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
SOUTHEAST AFGHANISTAN 73 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
afghanistan07O3.pdf (quoting gender expert in Kabul).
3. See, e.g., Fiona C. Ross, On Having Voice and Being Heard Some After-Effects of Testify-
ing Before the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 3 ANTHROPOLOGICAL
THEORY 325 (2003).
4. See Fionnuala Ni Aolin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth and Transition, 16 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 229 (2007).
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where profound social and political change is negotiated. Reflection on the
modalities of change requires paying attention to the ways in which violence
is ended, paused, or shifted within a society. Transition is generally marked
by impact on the levels of public violence experienced in a given society
and the security that is perceived to accompany it. The gender analysis
advanced here suggests we need to be more adept in understanding what
happens to and for women in these contexts.
The absence of a gender dimension in the establishment, revision, and
operation of new legal and political institutions in transitional societies has
been acknowledged.' The genealogy of institutional gaps for women traces to
omissions from peace-making and transitionary "deal-making," compounding
the normative legal gaps that facilitate further exclusions down the line. But
additional exploration is required to assess why women remain structurally
excluded, and in particular why they remain excluded as the processes
of transition become increasingly internationalized. 6 This article does not
cover all that terrain but explores why internationalization, which at least
in theory leads us to presuppose that the security outcomes will be better
for women (thus perhaps leading to greater institutional involvement and
gain), does not deliver that dividend. Part II of this article commences with
scrutiny of the forms of patriarchy that are present in transitional societies,
and particularly explores the nexus of complimentary patriarchies that are
evidenced between local and international actors. Attention is paid to the
import of patriarchy derived from international oversight and/or intervention
and its social, political, and legal interaction with local patriarchies. The
international community occupies a complex role in transitioning societies,
evidenced by the interplay between western and local masculinities. Its role
is particularly heightened as the perceived guarantor of security and stabil-
ity, though as the analysis explores, such presence or support may not be
synonymous with gender security.
The central focus in Part III is to account for and explain the dynamics
of security transitions for women in conflicted societies. Security is used as
an embracive concept, encompassing both the notion of physical security
for women (or lack thereof) in transitional societies and a broader notion of
human security that presuppose a relationship between material security, legal
security, and political capacity. The language of security is omnipresent in
transitional justice discourses. It manifests particularly around demilitarization
5. Christine Bell, Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Nf Aol~in, Justice Discourses in Transition,
13 Soc & LEGAL STUD. 305 (2004).
6. These exclusions remain despite UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 & 1820. Women
and Peace and Security, adopted 31 Oct. 2000, S.C. Res. 1325, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess.,
4213th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 325 (2000); Acts of Sexual Violence Against Civilians in
Armed Conflicts, adopted 19 June 2008, S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. SCOR, 63d Sess., 5916th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (2008).
2009
HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
and ending conflict, and it is implicit in certain models of reconciliation.
Part III begins an assessment of what a multi-layered concept of transitional
security for women might encompass and identifies the linkage between
gendered security and successful gender accountability in the post-conflict
environment. The exploration centers on the meanings and forms of security
that materialize in post-conflict societies and the gap that emerges between
the rhetoric and the reality of lived security for women as societies experi-
ence an alteration in the patterns, forms, or levels of violence.
Part IV examines the role that security sector reform plays in the per-
ceived success of transition in post conflict societies. Security sector reform
has become synonymous with internationally supported stabilization and
reconstruction. The tension between complimentary local and international
imperatives, as contrasted with the impact of security sector reform for
women, is drawn out. In conclusion, this article begins to articulate what a
gendered vision of a secure transition might look like. Here the modalities
and interplay of conflict endings, and the processes that manage negotia-
tions and new beginnings are considered. The take-away message affirms the
centrality of security to credible transitional justice processes and encourages
the success or failure of the transitional project to be concretely measured
in terms of security gains for women.
II. THE PATRIARCHIES AT PLAY IN TRANSITION
A key element in the perceived success of many transitional accountabil-
ity mechanisms, and the willingness to establish new legal and political
institutions, lies in engaging the support of international organizations and
other states in their establishment. 7 The transitional moment is usually only
one point on the continuum of a protracted legal and political engagement
between the transitional state and the international community. The transi-
tional state is captured between the multiple interests of other states, their
willingness to articulate views about a regime or conflict, and their formal
or informal interaction with key actors at pivotal change moments. While
much could be said about this complex interaction in general, this analysis
will focus on two aspects: first, the relationship between the international
community's previously articulated views on human rights compliance during
a conflict or a period of authoritarian rule; and second, the complex role
that the international community can play in compounding gender inequality
and unaccountability once entangled with a transitional society.
7. The High Commissioner's Office in Bosnia; The Implementation Force (IFOR) and the
SFOR in Bosnia NATO-led multinational forces; Interim Authority in Kosova; United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).
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Recall that international entanglement with and oversight of transitional
societies rarely happens at the crucial transitional moment. Rather, there
has usually been a long interplay between the multiple interests of other
states, their willingness to articulate views about a regime or conflict, and
their formal or informal interaction with key actors at moments of significant
change. This analysis suggest that there is a definable connection between
the international community's previously articulated views on human rights
compliance during a conflict or period of authoritarian rule and the extent to
which this view has ignored and/or sidelined women's experiences of harms.
The general dimensions of "harm naming" are critical to and a central aspect
of transition, namely dealing with the past abuses of the prior regime, and
inter alia forming the basis for the institutional legal and political reforms
that follow.8 It is also central to the lack of naming that occurs for ordinary
violence during the conflict/repressive period. The general pattern is that
this previous process of naming harms is extremely difficult to dislodge in
the transitional context.
We know that transitional societies are the subject of substantial inter-
national scrutiny prior to any settlement. Transitioning societies have been
repressive or violent (or both), and international oversight may have "named
and shamed" systematic and significant human rights violations in the pre-
transition phase. As a result, the kinds of human rights violations that have
been identified externally as particularly egregious during the conflict will
have a clear ascendency in the hierarchy of harms that are perceived to
merit review and redress in the post-conflict period. Gender-based harms
struggle to gain place in this hierarchy, thereby compounding the broader set
of social and political reasons why gender harms may be on the sidelines in
conflicted societies. For example, international nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Human Rights First, and Hu-
man Rights Watch may have been active in sending investigative missions,
producing numerous reports, and providing a large range of support for their
domestic NGO counterparts. When it comes time in the settlement phase of
a conflict or a regime handover, these prior interventions are critical to fram-
ing the way in which accountability is sought, articulated, and constructed.
This construction comes from intact western conceptions of human rights
hierarchies imbued with their inability to consider their own patriarchy and
unwillingness to recognize it at work in an export form.9 It is important
to recognize that the narrative constructed about the nature and form of
8. Fionnuala Nf Aolin, Exploring a Feminist Theory of Harm in the Context of Conflicted
and Post-Conflict Societies, QUEENS L.J. (forthcoming 2010).
9. Madeline Rees, International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Cost of Ignoring
Gender, in THE POST WAR MOMENT: MILITARIES, MASCULINITIES AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING BOSNIA
AND THE NETHERLANDS 51-57 (Dubravka Zarkov & Cynthia Cockburn eds., 2002).
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violations in transitional societies has as much to do with the demands for
accountability at the transitional moment as it has with the prior narrative
of violence and causality. This narrative is significantly constructed by the
watchful and deeply involved international community. It is a narrative with
a distinctly gendered dimension.
How are we to understand these international patriarchies and to ap-
praise the nature of their effects? While patriarchy is broadly understood to
capture the idea of male power over the female, its etymology is traced to
the Roman law construct of familial social organization. This pedigree affirms
the superiority of the father in the family or clan, the dependence of women
and children upon him, and the reckoning of descent and inheritance in the
male line. In contemporary times, theorists have identified organic linkages
between patriarchy and its contemporary outworkings and various forms
of masculinity as they arise within societies and institutions. A preponder-
ance of literatures across disciplines has deepened our understanding of
how masculinities are constructed and differentiated.10 In parallel, the role
of masculinity norms "in giving rise to violence against women is being
theoretically scrutinized,"'" and resultantly some international organiza-
tions have recognized (albeit on an ad hoc basis) that there is a pressing
need to deconstruct and reduce the negative aspects of masculinity and to
integrate men and boys into programs aimed at reducing violence against
women. 2 In general, much less scrutiny has been given to dissecting the
patriarchy inherent in international institutions, even less to revealing the
masculinity bias of these same bodies and the actors who represent them.
This article asserts that this bias illuminates why transitional justice in the
broadest sense fails women and also why the enforcement of the cornerstone
of transition in conflicted societies (namely security) fails to meet the basic
test of gender neutrality.
In this context, we should note that international interface and influ-
ence in post-conflict societies is compounded by the role of such key
international actors as the United Nations. So where the United Nations
has paid particular attention to a conflicted or authoritarian society in the
form of resolutions, mandated Special Rapporteurs, Special Representatives,
and inclusion in thematic oversight in addition to review by treaty bodies,
a substantive narrative already exists in the international/national context
10. See, e.g., NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMININITIES, MASCULINITIES, SEXUALITIES: FREUD AND BEYOND (1994);
R.W. CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON AND SEXUAL POLITICS (1987).
11. See Kirsten Anderson, Violence Against Women: State Responsibilities in International
Human Rights Law to Address Harmful Masculinities, 26 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 173, 175
(2008).
12. For a review of the effects of such integration in a variety of post-conflict and health
related programs see Barker & Ricardo, supra note 1.
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about the form and nature of violations that have taken place.13 This narrative
evidences a fundamental structural problem, namely that certain kinds of
bodily harms are elevated over others in terms of their perceived seriousness.
Thus, violence to women often fails to fit the narrow legal categories that
dominate general understanding of serious human rights violations, 14 and
normal pervasive sexual and physical violence against women is simply not
counted in the overall narrative of conflict or regime change. The Afghani
example provides a concrete illustration of this point.
When the United States-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October
2001, one of the myriad of justifications for the war (in addition to the de
facto activation of the self-defense provisions of the UN Charter) was the
rationalization that it would liberate women from "the misogynistic rule of
the Taliban."1s At least on its face, this rationale was carried through to the
Bonn Process of December 2001, where an accord was signed by represen-
tatives of the militia forces who fought with the United States-led coalition
against the Taliban, representatives of the former King of Afghanistan, and
representatives of various other exiled Afghani groups, as well as in the
Afghan Constitution of 2004, which contains specific guarantees to protect
women's rights. However, the litany of formal guarantees hides a far more
depressing and sober reality. Key to understanding the fundamental lack of
change and experience in the lives of women in Afghanistan is the measure-
ment of what constitutes "security" in the new Afghanistan and the lack of
accountability for previous violations experienced by women during the
Taliban regime. While the Taliban have been replaced, their internal suc-
cessors are in part regional military factions (often with histories of systemic
human rights violations and engagement in widespread criminal activity)
and conservative religious leaders who fundamentally share similar illiberal
views on the status and role of women in Afghani society. They have little
political appetite for social reform. In strategically supporting these elites, the
external actors (specifically the United States and its allies) have in practice
been prepared to accept widespread under-enforcement or non-enforcement
13. For example, the United Nations interface with Guatemala, where between 1982 and
1986 the Commission on Human Rights mandated a Special Rapporteur to study the
human rights situation in the country. This was followed in 1987 by a replacement
mandate-a Special Representative of the Commission to receive and evaluate informa-
tion from the government on the implementation of human rights protection measures
included in the new Constitution of 1985.
14. For example, it is only relatively recently that the European Court of Human Rights has
interpreted the ECHR prohibition on torture to include the experience of rape. See Aydin
v. Turkey, App. No. 23178/94, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866; see also Ivana Radacic, Rape
Cases in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Defining Rape and
Determining the Scope of the State's Obligations, EUR. Hum. RTS. L. REV. 357 (2008).
15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR INTIMIDATION AND ATrACKS AGAINST WOMEN IN PUBLIC
LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN 1 (2004).
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of women's rights (and their security) 6 because of the calculation that the
maintenance of these key alliances outweighs the interests of any particular
group in Afghani society, even those who offered a compelling text for inter-
vention. Moreover, international actors are unable to acknowledge their own
patriarchy as it informs their response to the marked gender discrimination
and violence that they confront on the ground.
The Afghan example potently illustrates how the shape of transition for
women is tremendously influenced by the role and stance of the international
community. It also demonstrates the extent to which human rights viola-
tions experienced by women (in this case during a prior oppressive regime)
can remain a continuous experience despite the claims of transition to the
public political spaces in society. This suggests that we need to think more
carefully about the interface between the broader international processes
focused on naming human rights violations in conflicted and authoritarian
societies, as they operate to frame the manner in which transitional account-
ability is sought, and in particular to expand our concepts of violent action
and social change within transitional societies.
Cynthia Cockburn and Dubravka Zarkov have argued that the post-
conflict environment, like conflict, is "vividly about male power systems,
struggles and identity formation."17 Moreover, there may be an enormous
flux in that male post-conflict fraternity, both on an individual and com-
munal level. So, men who were in power are losing power, other men are
taking their place, and as is often the case when a conflict stalemate arises,
internationals (generally culturally and politically differentiated other males)
are coming into a society to fill a vacuum. As Handrahan has noted, "[t]his
'international fraternity'-the community of decision makers and experts who
arrive after a conflict on a mission of 'good will'-holds the upper hand,
morally, economically and politically."8 However, while the international
presence is lauded for rescuing such societies from the worst of their own
excesses, what is little appreciated is that such men also bring with them
varying aspects of gender norms and patriarchal behavior that transpose into
the vacuum they fill.' 9 Moreover, despite an array of cultural differences
16. See Fionnuala Nf Aolin & Eilish Rooney, Underenforcement and Intersectionality:
Gendered Aspects of Transition for Women, 1 INT'L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 338 (2007).
17. Cited in Lori Handrahan, Conflict, Gender, Ethnicity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 429, at 433 (2004).
18. Id. at 433.
19. See Lesley Abdela, Kosovo: Missed Opportunities, Lessons for the Future, 13 DEV. PRAC.
208 (2003) (report of the former Deputy-Director, NGO, Civil Society Building for the
OSCE Mission-Kosovo detailing the consistent lack of integration of women and gender-
related issues into the planning of the Interim Arrangements for Kosovo), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09614520302942; see also Human Rights Watch, Not on the
Agenda: The Continuing Failure to Address Accountability in Kosovo Post-March 2004
(29 May 2006), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11308/.
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between locals and internationals, frequently overlooked are fundamentally
similar patriarchal views that internal and external elites share, which operate
in tandem to exclude, silence, or nullify women's needs from the transitional
space. As Cockburn and Zarkov's edited collection explores, the loosening of
rigid gender roles from the social flux that conflict inevitably creates is not
necessarily sealed off at conflict's end or transition by national male leader-
ship, but rather this role is taken up by the male international development
community, "whose own sense of patriarchy-as-normal is quite intact."20
III. SECURITY AND TRANSITION
There is a self-evident link between security in the transitional environment
and gender accountability (or equality) in any form, whether by trial, truth
commissions, or otherwise. A starting point for this interrogation is challeng-
ing the assumption that women's security and men's security are identical
in such circumstances.2 1 Rather, as research on women's security highlights,
there are numerous obstacles in the post-conflict and transitional political
environment to meaningful security for women. Such obstacles include:
the lack of a secure physical environment, making it dangerous for women
to function in any meaningful sense in the public sphere for fear of harm;
particular vulnerability to sex-based violence unchecked by the formal end
of hostilities or the change-over in regime; allied with a lack of political
acknowledgement giving credence to a wider and more embracive notion
of security beyond a narrow militaristic and state-oriented approach. Argu-
ably, a broader approach to security could function to prevent or ameliorate
the systematic emergence in many transitional societies of organized crime
and racist or minority targeted violence in the transitional phase2 2 So while
the primary purpose of addressing gender security remains to redress the
imbalance and distortion produced by dominant security discourses and
the policies that accompany them, its broader effects may transform the
post-conflict environment in unexpected ways.
20. Handrahan, supra note 17, at 436. See generally ARMS To FIGHT, ARMS TO PROTECT: WOMEN
SPEAK OUT ABOUT CONFLICT (Olivia Bennett, Jo Bexley & Kitty Warnock eds., 1995).
21. See Mary Caprioli, Democracy and Human Rights Versus Women's Security: A Contra-
diction, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 411 (2004).
22. See, e.g., Thokozani Xaba, Masculinity and its Malcontents: the Confrontation Between
"Struggle Masculinity" and "Post-Struggle Masculinity," in CHANGING MEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
105 (Robert Morrell ed., 2001); Charles Ukeje, Youths, Violence and the Collapse of
Public Order in the Niger Delta of Nigeria 26 AFR. DEV. 338 (2001); Center for the Stud.
of Violence and Reconciliation, Into the Heart of Darkness: Journeys of the Amagents in
Crime, Violence and Death, Paper prepared as part of research conducted for Council
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) (1998).
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Strong theoretical challenges have been mounted to the dominance of
state-based approaches to security studies by asserting that individual and
societal approaches to security can give greater insight into the structural
causes of violence and conflict, thereby realigning how the approach to
conflict resolution and transition is constructed2 3 From these studies some
central insights are highly relevant to the ideas explored here. The work of
Johan Galtung and Kenneth Boulding was amongst the first to assert the need
to acknowledge both individual and social elements of security.24 Galtung in
particular emphasized that peace did not simply mean the absence of war-it
was also related to the establishment of the conditions for social justice. His
views on violence are particularly convincing here, noting that violence is
all those "unavoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally to
life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially
possible." 25 From this he constructs a key distinction between negative and
positive peace. He argued that the absence of armed conflict can be defined
as negative peace, and positive peace means the absence of both direct
physical violence and indirect structural and cultural violence.26
This position has a strong resonance with the argument advanced here,
namely that in projecting a narrow focus on particular forms of physical
violence to the person, the transitional context (and specifically its account-
ability mechanisms) ignore a much wider range of institutional and structural
elements that may cause greater harms to society as a whole and to women
in particular. A key element of this critique of the dominant language of
security is that emphasis on direct physical violence (generally specific to
defined periods of conflict), whether through truth processes or political
rhetoric, tends to exclude the broader relevance of the language of security
for women. 27 For many women the relationship between the physical violence
experienced during conflict (noting that term will be broadly understood) and
the security of the post-conflict environment are not discontinuous realities,
but rather part of one singular experience that is not compartmentalized.
Furthermore, recent work has confirmed that violence against women not
only persists but "even increases beyond pre-war levels and sometimes even
beyond wartime levels." 28 Thus, accountability for violence may not have the
23. See Pinar Bilgin, Individual and Societal Dimensions of Security, 5 INT'L STUD. REV. 203
(2003).
24. See Johan Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27 J. PEACE RES. 291 (1990) (defining cultural vio-
lence as those mechanisms which render acceptable both direct violence and structural
violence).
25. See JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION
197 (1996).
26. Id. at 32.
27. See also Fionnuala Ni Aolgin, Political Violence and Gender in Times of Transition, 15
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 829 (2006).
28. Donna Pankhurst, Post-War Backlash Violence Against Women What Can Masculinity
Explain?, in GENDERED PEACE WOMEN'S STRUGGLES FOR POST-WAR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION 293
(Donna Pankhurst ed., 2007).
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same end point for women in the post-conflict/transitional environment as it
may have for male combatants or male political actors. This central insight
ought to profoundly redefine how we come to determine what constitutes
security in the post-conflict environment, and whose securities are being
advanced by a narrow as opposed to a broad definition.
Some inroads are being made on the traditionally narrow and state-
oriented view that security discourse belongs to and is only really about
the state. For example, the Commission on Human Security has started to
move the discourse to a more inclusive basis, beginning with the premise
that achieving human security requires not only protection but also a strategy
to empower people to support themselves.2 9 A real and pressing question
is whether we consider massive economic deprivation as a security threat,
particularly when those made most vulnerable in most societies as a result
of such deprivations are women and children. Notably, the former Secretary-
General of the United Nations has articulated the view in his report, The
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies,
that the relationship between massive economic deprivation and violence
needs to be more carefully considered in transitional processes.30
The starting point is to understand the centrality of security as a concept
for individual and community well-being. Significant debates are ongoing
concerning the definition of security.31 Two divergent starting points offer
themselves. First, there is a broad concept of security that encompasses
physical, social, economic, and sexual security. This article asserts that when
all these securities are combined in a manner that elevates and affirms the
experience and relevance of gender, then gendered security is achievable.
This method is identified as a process of "re-gendering" security. In this view,
gendered security can be seen as an umbrella that brings together a wide
set of institutions and structures that guarantee security within the state. In
this approach, reform would be linked to broad democratic transformation
that is based on equality principles applied to multiple legal spheres and
contains a redistributive economic dimension. While these goals may seem
wider than the narrow set of imperatives which have traditionally dominated
transitional justice discourse, there is increasing recognition that a failure to
address the broader demand for economic and political transformation can
have profoundly disabling and limiting effects on the capacity for account-
ability in the traditional transitional justice mode.
29. COMMISSION ON HUMAN SECURITY, HUMAN SECURITY Now (2003), available at http://www.
humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf.
30. The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Tran-
sitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Delivered to Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (23 Aug. 2004).
31. These divergent views have a very specific effect on the articulations of policy and
practice in the area of security sector reform outlined in Part IV.
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The second approach to security adopts a narrow definition that con-
ceives of security in physical terms only. In this view, security is aimed at
delivering specifically defined outcomes conveyed by a narrowly defined
security apparatus. Thus, for example, when post-conflict or repression se-
curity discourse elevates the protection of and accountability for physical
security only and narrows what counts as physical violence for the purposes
of containing conflict or repression (often conflating physical security with
narrowly defined sexual security for women), there are decisively negative
implications for women.32 Moreover when violence is understood in spe-
cific and narrow ways, this affects broader understandings of what issues
are open for negotiation, mediation, and reform purposes, and what kinds
of institutional reforms ought to follow.
Some scholars have identified cultural elements as the most substantive
barrier to security, but the analysis contained in Part II of this article sug-
gests that cultural evaluation ought to include reflection on the ingrained
patriarchies that international interface and oversight brings to transitional
societies, and should not be presumed to apply to "native" cultures only.33
Research has also identified the organic link between a lack of gender security
and entrenched structures of inequality and discrimination.14 Others have
focused on the prevalence of violence that woman in transitional societies
experience, both in the public and private spheres. Such research confirms
that meaningful security and equality for women will not be achieved by
simply placing barriers to state (or public) violence directed against them;
rather, fundamentally transformative action against violence and its underlying
causes in the private sphere must be part of the transformative project.
A. Disarmament and Security
As we identify a tension between narrow and broader notions of security in
the post-conflict environment, an important arena to address directly is the
relationship between disarmament and security. The requirement to disarm
combatants frequently constitutes a core element of transitional processes.31 It
32. Christine Bell, Women Address the Problems of Peace Agreements, in PEACE WORK: WOMEN,
ARMED CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION 96 (Radhika Coomaraswamy & Dilrukshi Fonseka eds.,
2004); N[AolAin, supra note 27.
33. Arif Dirlik, Culturalism as Hegemonic Ideology and Liberating Practice, CULTURL CRITIQUE
6 (1987). See alsoJohan Galtung, Cultural Violence, 27J. PEACE RES. 291 (1990) (defining
cultural violence as those mechanisms which render acceptable both direct violence
and structural violence).
34. J. ANN TICKNER, GENDER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON ACHIEVING GLOBAL
SECURITY (1992).
35. See, e.g., The Agreement, Gr. Brit.-Ir., 10 Apr. 1998, § 8, available at http:\\www.nio.
gov.uk/the-agreement (hereinafter Belfast Agreement). The Belfast Agreement deals with
security and refers to the "normalization" of security arrangements and practices. This
includes the reduction of armed forces, the removal of security installations, and emer-
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is a process that has deeply involved the international community in various
matrixes. Its presence or absence raises complex questions in post-conflict
or regime-change societies from a gender perspective. The relationship of
disarmament to accountability for human rights violations is a complex
one, not least because in some contexts successful disarmament may be
premised on political compromises that exclude or deny the possibility of
accountability.
From a gender perspective a number of issues arise. First, what constitutes
disarmament sufficient to satisfy a ceasefire requirement in the political/mili-
tary sense may not in fact entail the removal of all such weapons from the
public, and more importantly the private sphere. Second, a perhaps trite but
true observation is that the disarmament of weapons is not the disarmament
of minds. Working this premise through we find that the underlying social
psychological dimensions that, in a conflicted society, have supported the
resort to violence and the elevation of particular forms of masculinity that
accompany it, are not in any sense undermined or addressed by a formal
disarmament process. Thus, a key issue to be addressed concerning vio-
lence in conflicted societies is what exactly is meant by the term "ending
violence." In the parlance of ending public violence or internal conflict this
conversation revolves around decommissioning weapons and getting armed
paramilitaries/insurgents to swap violent confrontation for peaceful debate
about contested issues. However, this kind of discussion rarely engages with
the fundamental requirement of changing deep-seated social attitudes toward
the use of violence. 6 Attitudinal change is critical and under-valued. For
women, it means that while guns may physically no longer be present in
public spaces, this does not change a social psychology that makes the use
of violence acceptable (whether in the private or public sphere).
A highly complex issue that arises in the context of identifying and
managing the forms and facilitators of violence in many transitional soci-
eties is the relationship between disarmament and intimate violence. The
quandaries have been graphically identified in such transitional societies as
gency powers, and other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peace-
ful society. The text of the Agreement Disarmament is discussed further below in Part IV
infra. For interesting discussions involving the masculinities at play in the Colombian
DDR process see Kimberly Theidon, Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia, 31 HuM. RTS.
Q. 1 (2009); Fredy Hernan Gomez Alcaraz & Carlos Ivan Garcia Suarez, Masculinity
and Violence in Colombia: Deconstructing the Conventional Way of Becoming a Man,
in THE OTHER HALF OF GENDER 93 (lan Bannon & Maria Correia eds., 2006).
36. See AMNESTY INT'L, THE IMPACT OF GUNS ON WOMEN'S LIVES (2005) (containing a sustained
and detailed cross-jurisdictional study of the "ordinary" impact of gun violence against
women). The study notes that although "available data supports the widespread assump-
tion that most direct casualties of gun violence are men, particularly young men, women
suffer disproportionately from firearms violence, given that they are almost never the
buyers, owners or users of such weapons." Id. at 2.
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South Africa,37 where the perceived escalation of domestic violence rates
post-apartheid have raised deep concerns about the relationship between pre-
existing apartheid violence and its spill-over to a transitional society.18 There
is evidence that post-conflict societies do (at least) statistically experience
greater proportions of domestic and intimate violence. Monica McWilliams
has argued that domestic violence experienced by women during conflict may
be more severe in its form (particularly in ethno-national conflicts) because
the resort to external mediation of such violence (e.g. access to police) may
have been entirely absent.3 9 Thus, increased reporting at the end of conflict
may not mean absolute empirical increases in violence per se; rather it may
simply mean that reporting is possible where it was not previously, and in
fact, the forms of violence may be more muted.
Other theorists have argued that the reassertion of violence in the private
sphere during the transitional phase constitutes a form of compensation
for male combatants, for their loss of public status and hegemony.40 This is
graphically shown by the psychological phenomena of the returning war-
rior who has, through conflict, normalized the use of violence and views
the home as another site in which to exercise power and control through
physical force. Notably, in previous work examining truth processes, it has
been demonstrated that domestic and intimate violence, as it was experi-
enced or heightened for women during conflict or authoritarian regimes, has
never been examined as an integral part of the accounting for the totality
of violence experienced by women at conflict's end.41
The disarmament process can present many complexities for paral-
lel accountability mechanisms, not least because partial, incomplete, or
unsatisfactory disarmament means that there is little gap between viola-
tions that took place during a conflict/prior regime and those taking place
post-transition. Moreover, where discharged-but-not-disarmed combatants
return to their homes and families with their weapons, the sites of violence
may simply move from the public to the private sphere. From the gendered
critique of accountability mechanisms, what we learn is that truth processes
may examine the prior violence in the public sphere but will not engage in
any way with the continual violence that is facilitated in the private sphere
by non-rehabilitated and non-disarmed former combatants. The disconnect
between the operation and scope of the transitional justice mechanism and
37. See infra Part IV, Section C for further discussion.
38. These issues are further addressed infra in Section C discussing Security Sector Reform
in post conflict or repressive societies.
39. See MONICA MCWLLIAMS ET AL., TACKLING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A POLICY FOR NORTHERN IRELAND
(1995).
40. See, e.g., Anu Pillay, Violence Against Women in the Aftermath, inTHE AFTERMATH, WOMEN
IN POST-CONFLIcT TRANSFORMATION (Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay & Meredeth Turshen eds.,
2002).
41. Ni Aolgin & Turner, supra note 4.
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the intimate and everyday realities of living with a former combatant for
women could hardly be more starkly contrasted.
The absence of meaningful security (in both a narrow and broad defi-
nition) for women in the post-conflict or transitional phase has direct and
measurable effects on women's interest and participation in accountability
processes. At the simplest level, if it is not physically safe for women to testify
before such processes (whether international, hybrid, or domestic courts or
tribunals) by virtue of an insecure physical environment (and the barriers
to women in this context will be higher than for men), then the absence
of security will affect the narrative that emerges from the process. But at
a deeper level, if we take security to encompass a wide range of markers,
where women continue to experience high levels of "normal" sexual and
physical violence within a transitional society, it becomes deeply problem-
atic to expect women to make artificial distinctions between pre- and post-
transition harms when the experience of harm may be continuous. At the
very least this ought to have significant implications for our understanding
of what constitutes a successful transition.
IV. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND TRANSITION
As we probe and problematize what a successful and secure transition
would be like for women, a. pragmatic site of analysis requires examina-
tion of security sector reform. The term "security sector reform" first made
an appearance in a speech by Clare Short, the British Minister for Inter-
national Development, in 1997.42 The concept of security sector reform
has substantial political and policy currency in Europe but generally not
in the United States. Despite this, the concept has permeated a number of
international policy contexts in recent years and has a wide range of ap-
plications beyond the post-conflict society. It has been linked inter alia with
"debates on poverty alleviation, sustainable development, professionalization
of the security forces, and good governance."43 Security sector reform has
42. Theodor H. Winkler, Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the
Security Sector and International Order 5 (Geneva Ctr. for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2002). Short's concept was further conceptually
developed by European and Canadian academics in subsequent years. However, some
challenge has been made to the notion of the "newness" of this field. Farr argues that
"versions of the current security sector reform debate have been ongoing since at least
the middle of the 19th century." SeeVANESSA A. FARR, BERCHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
CONFLICT MGMT., VOICES FROM THE MARGINS: A RESPONSE TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN DEVELOPING
AND TRANSmIONAL COUNTRIES, available at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/articles/ssr-farr.
pdf. Farr also articulates that contemporary theorists (mostly men) fail to articulate and
acknowledge their intellectual debts. Id. at 3.
43. NICOLE BALL, TSJEARD BOuTA & Luc VAN DE GOOR, ENHANCING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF THE
SECURITY SECTOR: AN INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 12 (2003).
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its roots in western donor debates over how best to target and implement
development assistance, thereby fostering a policy nexus between poverty
and security debates. 4 Here security sector reform is asserted as an integral
part of development assistance, especially in post-conflict societies, which
are particularly prone to revert back to violent conflict.45
Security sector reform applies to repressive regimes, faltering or failed
entities, transitioning states, and democratic states. Debates in all these
contexts have concentrated on oversight and structure of civil-military rela-
tions, 46 the democratic control of the armed forces, and the integration of all
the security agencies responsible for securing a state's internal and external
integrity. Generally all these conversations exclude women, and women are
not represented at the "tables" where such discussions take place.
A precise and agreed definition for "security sector reform" by all the
agencies, governments, institutions, and international organizations using it
is still lacking-what is clear is that security sector reform is a broad concept
which covers a multitude of relationships and sites. This article endorses the
view that the broadest possible consensus on the scope of security sector
reform is vital to gender parity and visibility and is essential to the practical
rolling out of security in post-conflict societies.
To this end, this part of the article undertakes a review of security sector
reform through a gender lens as a means of expanding our conceptualization
of what gender security can and might mean in post-conflict societies. In
advancing this goal, it is important to pay attention to the manner in which
the term "women" can be mentioned in policy-making contexts but without
bringing the concept of gender into play. This analysis adopts three substan-
tial methods for responding to gender deficits: a mainstreaming approach, a
specialized focus, and a cross-cutting method. A mainstreaming approach
draws on the United Nations definition which is described as involving
the "assess[ment of] the implications for women and men of any planned
action, including legislation, policies or programmes."47 A specialized ap-
44. A good example is provided by the Netherlands. "Peace and Security are preconditions
for development and poverty reduction, which make security a sustainable development
issue." Id.
45. However, one clear issue in this context is to ensure recognition that a holistic vision of
SSR within the "development community" is not homogenous. See FARR, BERGHOF RESEARCH
CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., supra note 42, at 3; see also Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General, United Nations, Address to World Bank: Peace and Development--One Struggle,
Two Fronts (19 Oct. 1999) ("development has no worse enemy than war").
46. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS (1957).
47. Report of the Economic and Social Council for 1997, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., at 28,
U.N. Doc. A/52/3 (1997). By comparison the European Commission defines gender
mainstreaming as "the integration of the gender perspective into every stage of policy
process-design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation-with a view to pro-
moting equality between women and men."; see Ulla Sladek, The CoP's definition of
Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality (13 Nov. 2007), available at http://www.
gendermainstreaming-cop.eu/node/1 74.
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proach involves carving out unique protections and mechanisms to ensure
distinct spaces of gender equality within broader contexts (that may or may
not function gender neutrally). A cross-cutting approach involves making
provisions simultaneously for both mainstreaming and specialization in the
same policy or legislative context. These three schemes provide useful tools
to think about how security sector reform does or does not seek to ensure
gender integration in its policy formation, execution, and assessments of
its own success or failure.48 A substantial challenge lies in identifying what
mainstreaming and other mechanisms would practically encompass in the
security sector reform context and how they would transform the masculine
cultures dominant in this sector to deliver gendered security in practice.
A. BROADER CHALLENGES TO GENDERED SECURITY SECTOR
REFORM
Some commentators assert that "security [is] accompanied by the recognition
that the monopoly of power, and particularly the monopoly of the legitimate
exercise of force, has to be vested in the community, the state and cannot
rest anywhere else."49 There is no doubt that a growing number of states are
challenged by the loss of their monopoly on the use of force. Challenges
identified arise from the privatization of the exercise of force, the inability
of some states to control their armed or military forces in part or in full, the
capacity of armed and powerful remnants of totalitarian or extremist fac-
tions to exercise force, the parallel state-control mechanisms exercised by
powerful criminal or terrorist organizations, and the capacity of technological
developments to make traditional exercises of state force obsolete. In this
view, the major challenge to security sector reform for the state is to reassert
its full control and authority over the exercise of force.50
One such approach links security sector reform (whether in democratic
or non-democratic contexts) to funneling the security sector back to civil-
ian and democratic control. It is important to stress the extent to which this
widespread debate (with significant legitimacy among international states
and institutions) fails to engage with the patriarchies and exclusions that are
48. VASUKI NESIAH ET AL., INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND GENDER: PRINCIPLES,
POUCIES, AND PROCEDURES (2006) "This report uses the term 'gender' broadly to encompass
the ways in which sexual identity and difference are constructed (and contested) in
various contexts and impact men's and women's experiences of human rights abuse."
The report addresses how "laittitudes and ideologies regarding sexual identity and dif-
ference can motivate and shape human rights violations against both men and women".
An important reference in security sector reform is to think through how these "attitudes
and ideologies" can permeate and shape the reform process.
49. See Winkler, supra note 42, at 3.
50. There are also grassroots challenges to the dominance of the state from such community-
based initiatives as restorative justice programs.
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reinforced (and/or invented) to re-exercise that form of control."1 Thus, an
important conclusion drawn here is that the reformist mode of security sector
reform contains an explicit modeling on western security sector organizations
with a compelling blind-spot about the gender distortions inherent in these
institutions and their subsequent export to other states. Compelling research
undertaken on intimate violence experienced by partners of military person-
nel and the socially constructed genderedness of the military community in
western states demonstrates the evident contradictions inherent in exporting
western military models to transitioning states as presumed ideals of virtue.52
As Part II of the article asserted, in these exchanges complimentary rather
than contradictory patriarchies may meet in the guise of reform, and the
exchange may do little more than further embed existing propensities to
and silences around violence. The particular danger here is that the legiti-
mization and external validation that accompanies strategies for successful
security sector reform programs actually entrench gender-based exclusions
and discriminations in ways that are extremely difficult to dislodge.
Alternatively some literature in the field presents a view of security that
is described as more cooperative in nature and views the state in partner-
ship with community and other societal groups to share responsibility for
and capacity to exercise force and thus ensure (or repress) security. Such
cooperative or community based approaches need critical assessment from
a gender perspective. While they may be more informal, locally based, and
communal in structure, this does not mean that they are gender neutral nor
even positively disposed towards women's needs. In fact, quite the oppo-
site can be true in practice. Critical probing of these co-operative models
reveals substantial concern as to whether cooperative models actually seek
to deliver shared (and gender sensitive) notions of security, or whether the
semantics mask equally problematic structural exclusions.
Aside from specific cooperative models, extensive institution discussions
are taking place about a wider definition of security as discussed in Part
51. An example is found in a challenging review by the Bonn International Center for
Conversion, Voice and Accountability in the Security Sector. There is a positive and
indeed progressive emphasis on the relationship between security and poverty. The report
highlights the way in which poor people experience ill-security far more frequently and
negatively. However, there is almost no disaggregation of the gendered nature of poverty
in most societies, nor is there a link made between "intimate" violence, poverty, gender,
and security reform. Another clear bias in the report is the use of the term "victim,"
stressing at the outset that: "Although men are more frequently the victims of war and
violent crime, modern war is increasingly deadly for women and children." Again, there
is a lack of critical analysis around what hierarchies of victims are constructed, and
how women are often categorized in the secondary rather than the primary categories
of victimhood. NICOLE BALL & MICHAEL BRzosKA, BONN INT'L CTR. FOR CONVERSION, VOICE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE SECURITY SECTOR (July 2002), available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.
org/files/portal/issueareas/security/security-pdf/2002 Balletal.pdf.
52. See, e.g., Deborah Harrison, Violence in Military Community, in MILITARY MASCULINITIES
IDENTITY AND THE STATE 71 (Paul R. Higate ed., 2003).
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III of this article. For example, drawing on the broader analysis of security,
the Commission on Human Security's 2003 articulation of an individually
empowered model of security has much to offer the discussions of security
definition in the security sector reform context.
Both state and cooperative models present reform opportunities. In theory
both could be sites in which the three models identified above (mainstream-
ing, specialization, and cross-cutting approaches) are utilized. Moreover, we
should not assume that it is either a state or a communal model that will
deliver security sector reform for women. Mixed state/communal structures
may in reality provide the most successful models both generally and from
a gender audit perspective. A real test for national and international policy
makers is to think through what this kind of mixed partnership would mean
for the interests that to date have been dominant in security sector reform
politics.
The challenge for the state and the communal modalities is twofold: first,
to be capable of identifying and addressing entrenched, discriminatory, and
exclusionary masculinities; and second, to meaningfully apply mainstream-
ing, specialized, or cross-cutting approaches to address the gender deficit in
the security sector reform process. This would also require identifying the
individuals and groups most marginalized from the security sector reform
process (mostly women, urban and rural poor, and ethnic/racial minorities),
and systematically working through how a mainstreaming, specialized or
cross-cutting approach would take account of their interests.
B. Security Sector Reform, Transition, and Transnational Interestss3
In the context of transitional states, Christine Bell's tripartite analytical struc-
ture assessing the phases of peace negotiations and peace-making generally
defined is useful1 s4 Bell identifies three phases in ending violent conflict:
first, the pre-negotiation stage; second, the framework or substantive agree-
ment phase; and finally the implementation phase. In all three contexts,
Bell identifies substantial barriers and pitfalls for women's participation
and substantive "take-up" of the issues that most substantially affect them.',
53. Some commentators have made further distinctions between different kinds of countries
that have high priority in security sector reform. See Int'l Alert, Damian Lilly & Michael
Von Tagen Page, The Privatisation of Security and Security Sector Reform (2002) (on file
with author) who identify five types of country groups: 1) consolidating democracies,
2) lapsing or stalled democracies, 3) transitional democracies, 4) conflict torn societies,
and 5) states under reconstruction.
54. CHRISTINE BELL, PEACE AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); see also Bell, Women Address
the Problems of Peace Agreements, supra note 32.
55. Bell, Women Address the Problems of Peace Agreements, supra note 32, at 100-16.
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These categories are a useful means to identify at what points and to what
degree security sector reform agendas manifest and when, if at all, gender
is integrated, It is evident that security sector reform issues arise in all three
contexts. If one starts from the position that women experience differential
exclusions from peace processes generally (in all three phases), such barriers
are further refined in the specifics of security sector reform. The exclusions
persist despite the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the recent
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1820.
In parallel, existing discourses also expose the view that "civilians are
... ill-equipped to address substantive issues related to the security sector." 6
If this is well received wisdom in ordinary times, we should assume that it
has a heightened sensitivity in situations of great political and military flux.
The "exclude civilians" view is compounded by the vision that formulat-
ing and executing security policy (in the narrowest sense) is a legitimate
responsibility (almost a "spheres of competence" approach) given to the
security forces themselves and, where applicable, to international military
elites. Additionally civil society organizations generally shy away from sub-
stantive engagement with such bodies or are simply not represented in the
spaces where the conversations about policy formation take place. Thus,
women face additional layers of exclusion because they are unrelentingly
absent from the military decision making processes and the small number
of women who "get to the negotiation tables" will be unlikely candidates
for a civilian addition to security sector reform conversations.
C. DDR, Transition, and Gender
Frequently the most obvious matter flagged as a security sector reform subject
is disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. DDR
efforts are integral parts of development aid and peace-making processes in
multiple conflict situations.s7 An extensive general literature has emerged on
the subject of DDR,18 as well as more particular case-study analyses, look-
56. BALL & BRZOSKA, supra note 51, at 11.
57. A strong link has been established between disarmament and development. See gener-
ally David A. Koplov & Philip G. Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral
DisarmamentAnd Development Assistance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 993 (1991); Herbert Wulf,
Disarmament as a Chance for Human Development: Is There a Peace Dividend? (U.N.
Dev. Programme, Occasional Paper No. 5, 1992).
58. See, e.g., Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, Demobilisation and
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Post-War and Transition Countries (2001). Mats R.
Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the
Termination of Armed Conflicts (Int'l Inst. for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper Series
No. 303, 1996); LoTrA HAGMAN & ZOE NIELSEN, INT'L PEACE ACADEMY, A FRAMEWORK FOR LASTING
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS IN CRISIS SITUATIONS (2003),
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ing at particular countries and how they have reintegrated and demobilized
(or not) former combatants.5 9 DDR is identified as central to ensuring and
changing the conditions of security at the community level. But, DDR comes
with strong instrumental and policy goals. At its essence it may function as
the most important preliminary step in ending or limiting violent conflict.
It can act instrumentally to facilitate control over armed forces, both state
and non-state.
There is an important and increasingly acknowledged relationship be-
tween disarmament and security. This includes both the realization of sexual
security for women as well as the broader concept of gender security that
may be advanced when disarmament is entwined with economic distribu-
tion and political representation. Disappointingly acknowledgement largely
comes in the form of specialized focus, for example as "an issue requiring
special attention" rather than being mainstreamed into state or institutional
processes involved with DDR. 60 In some literature there is a positive emphasis
and recognition of the role of female soldiers and the female dependents of
male combatants.61 The overarching limitation is the lack of gender main-
streaming in the DDR policy context.
available at http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/FRAMEWORKFOR_DDR.pdf; KEES KINGMA,
BONN INT'L CTR. FOR CONVERSION, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN POST-WAR
AND TRANSITION COUNTRIES (2001); KIMBERLY MAHLING CLARK, U.S AGENCY INT'L DEV., FOSTERING A
FAREWELL TO ARMS: PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED IN THE DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF Ex-
COMBATANTS (1996); U.N. DEP'T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND
REINTEGRATION OF Ex-COMBATANTS IN A PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT: PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (1999);
Mark Knight & Alpaslan Ozerdem, Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobiliza-
tion and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace, 41 J. PEACE
RES. 499 (2004).
59. See Jessica Schafer, A Baby Who Does Not Cry Will Not Be Suckled: AMODEG and the
Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers, 24 J. S. AFR. STUD. 207 (1998). An exploration of
the politics and the organization of the Mozambican demobilized soldier's association,
and their relationship with government, donors, and its own members; Kris Brown &
Corinna Hauswedell, Burying the Hatchet: The Decommissioning of Paramilitary Arms
in Northern Ireland (Bonn Int'l Ctr. for Conversion, Brief No. 22, 2002); Markus Koth,
To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia (Bonn
Int'l Ctr. for Conversion, Paper No. 43, 2005); Chris Alden, Making Old Soldiers Fade
Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique, 33
SECURITY DIALOGUE 341 (2002).
60. See KINGMA, supra note 58, at 35-38. (In this report the special attention runs to nine
lines of a fifty-one page report), Emily Schroeder, A Window of Opportunity in the
Democratic Republic of Congo: Incorporating a Gender Perspective on the Disarma-
ment, Demobilization, and Reintegration Process, 5 PEACE CONFLICT & DEV. 1, 3 (2003).
61. See, e.g., SUSAN McKAY & DYAN MAZURANA, WHERE ARE THE GIRLS? GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES IN
NORTHERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND MOZAMBIQUE: THEIR LIVES DURING AND AFTER WAR (2004);
MATT HOBSON, SAVE THE CHILDREN, FORGOTTEN CASUALTIES OF WAR: GIRLS IN ARMED CONFLICT
(2005), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/EVIU-6BSFEG/$file/
SCF-apr_2005.pdf?openelement; BETH VERHEY, REACHING THE GIRLS: STUDY ON GIRLS ASSOCI-
ATED WITH ARMED FORCES AND GROUPS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (2004), available at
http://www.crin.org/docs/Reaching-the-girls.pdf; Susan McKay & Dyan Mazurana, Girls
in Militaries, Paramilitaries, and Armed Opposition Groups (2002).
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The presence or absence of DDR raises complex questions in post-conflict
or regime change societies from a gender perspective. The requirement to
disarm combatants frequently constitutes a core element of transitional pro-
cesses.62 If we accept a link exists between past accountability and meaningful
security sector reform it is also evident that the complexity of concessions
made to secure political agreement can operate to undercut the transformative
potential offered by security sector reform. These compromises, mostly made
by elite men, often fail to engage with the particular vulnerabilities created
for women by partial or excluded accountability. These vulnerabilities are
critical to the creation (or lack) of security for women.
An obvious linking issue is how to measure the success or failure of
demobilization and disarmament from a gender perspective. This bench-
marking for success through a gender sensitive lens is markedly absent
throughout all the programs reviewed for this article. The underlying social-
psychological dimensions which, in a conflicted society, have supported the
resort to violence, and the elevation of particular forms of masculinity that
accompany it, are not in any sense undermined or addressed by a formal
demobilization process, and are usually not measured as a means to define
successful and secure transition. The disarmament process can further present
many complexities for parallel accountability mechanisms, not least because
partial, incomplete, or unsatisfactory disarmament means that there is little
gap between violations which took place during a conflict/prior regime and
those taking place post-transition.63 This article suggests that when security
sector reform (whether narrowly or broadly defined) is ineptly undertaken
fundamental accountability in the transition context is compromised. Self-
evidently, as outlined above, when combatants return home to their families
after an ineffective DDR process, the sites of violence may simply move
from the public to the private sphere.
D. Security Sector Reform and "Ordinary" Violence
As identified in Part II, disaggregating conflict or repressive violence from
intimate violence poses highly challenging conceptual and practical di-
mensions for transitioning societies. South Africa has been identified as the
62. See, e.g., Belfast Agreement, supra note 35, § 8. This Agreement include the reduction
of armed forces, the removal of security installations and emergency powers, and other
measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful society.
63. This was made evident in the Liberian context. A poorly planned and timed DDR pro-
gram was initiated on 8 December 2003. The session quickly deteriorated into looting,
violence, and mass rapes throughout Monrovia. Human Rights Watch, The Guns Are in
the Bushes: Continuing Abuses in Liberia, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (2003).
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quintessential example of these challenges, 64 where the perceived spiraling
of domestic violence rates post-apartheid challenge the notion that there
is a clear distinction between pre-existing gendered apartheid violence
and experiences of domestic and random gender-based violence in the
transition phase. As domestic and other forms of violence experienced by
women skyrocket, this peak of violence is not deemed relevant to security
sector reform. 61
Security sector reform has also consistently failed to engage with the
"returning warrior" problem, the combatant who may be out of circula-
tion for the purposes of public political violence but poses significant
risk in the domestic private sphere. Here again the integration of ordinary
and "conflict/regime" violence into security sector reform debates where
regulation of violence is at the heart of the discussion is markedly absent.
There is little acknowledgement in the general literature to the organic link
between ordinary and extra-ordinary violence.66 Moreover, there is a con-
ceptual unwillingness to affirm that a failure to address ordinary violence
has long-term and structural implications for the success of any specific
security reform efforts.
These observations suggest that transitioning societies in general, but
those examining security sector reform in particular, should pay particular
attention to the connections (or lack thereof) between ordinary and extra-
ordinary violence.67 There is a pivotal connection between the control of
force that is sought by security sector reform (extra-ordinary and public)
and a complete lack of systematic analysis of the ordinary private violence
experienced by women, which is completely disassociated from the wider
issues of control being exercised in society.68 In this context, there is a need
to challenge a militarized view of what constitutes safety and to bedrock
violence against women as a central (ordinary) aspect of the security that
needs to be created.
As we reflect what the concept of security means for post-conflict soci-
eties (and the relationship between ordinary and extra-ordinary violence) it
is particularly important to probe the distinctions between de jure and de
facto security. This requires meaningfully examining the security experience
for women as opposed to conducting box-ticking exercises that checks the
64. See, e.g., Sasha Gear, Wishing Us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-combatants in the "New"
South Africa, 8 VIOLENCE & TRANSITION SERIES (2002).
65. See Brandon Hamber, "We Must Be Very Careful How We Emancipate Our Women":
Shifting Masculinities in Post-Apartheid South-Africa (U.K. Econ. and Soc. Res. Council
New Security Challenges Programme, Working Paper, 2006) (on file with author).
66. One exception is the work of LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence
and Women's Status, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED
CONFLICT 325 (2004).
67. NESIAH ET AL., supra note 48, at 25.
68. See FARR, BERGHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., supra note 42, at 4.
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elite definitions of secure environments but does not actually test or ensure
that security is experienced in practice by women. 69 A prime example of
this gap between de facto and de jure security has been identified in the
experiences of women in post-Taliban Afghanistan discussed above.70
The security sector reform process raises significant issues about the
interface between international masculinities as they connect with the societ-
ies experiencing transition. An important general element to consider here
is whether the bureaucratic, command-control-oriented, masculine systems
and structures which pervade the international community's interface with
domestic security sector systems are actually structurally capable of accom-
modating change. Nonetheless a key element in the perceived success of
many transitional accountability mechanisms is the support of international
organizations and other states in their establishment as discussed above.
A good example of the methodological problem is represented by the
work of political scientists Neil J. Mitchell and James M. McCormick, who
have assessed the political and economic causes of human rights viola-
tions71 through their use of Amnesty International reports to develop a two-
dimensional scale of human rights violations for countries mentioned in the
reports. The coding used related to civil and political violations only, with
key violations such as arbitrary imprisonment and the systematic use of kill-
ings and torture against prisoners highlighted. In this scale and approach,
countries are rated and compared for their human rights performance. The
categories privilege the experience of men, inherently exclude women's
experiences, and have an evident impact on the measures that are adopted
to respond to the perceived seriousness and scale of a state's human rights
record. 72 This is but one example of systematic methodological processes
that create the broader context in which harms experienced by women are
acted upon by national and international actors. Specifically, there is an
entrenched disconnect in linking the general continuum of violence that
women experience, whether in times of conflict, peace, or transition. These
experiences are part of the broader context into which security sector reform
69. See THE AFTERMATH: WOMEN IN POST-CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Sheila Meintjes et. al. eds.,
2001).
70. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "KILLING YOU WAS A VERY EASY THING FOR Us," supra note 2, at 73.
("While the de jure discrimination and limits on freedom of movement and dress of the
Taliban have largely ended, life for too many women and girls in Afghanistan remains
replete with similar, de facto restrictions"). Examples also about in "post-conflict" Zim-
babwe, Namibia, Eritrea, Mozambique, and Algeria. See Donna Pankhurst, Women,
Gender, and Peacebuilding (Ctr. for Conflict Resolution, Dep't of Peace Studies, Working
Paper No. 5, 2000).
71. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, Economic and Political Explanations of
Human Rights Violations, 40 WORLD POL. 476 (1988).
72. Amnesty International reports that such acts include violence against women, arbitrary
arrests, the abuse of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people as human rights
abuses. See AMNESTY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT (2006).
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is placed. This analysis suggests that a failure to deal with these broader
contextual issues will limit the extent to which security sector reform can
meaningfully contribute to gendered security.
E. Critique of Mainstream Approaches to SSR
There is a substantial body of general criticism concerning existing approaches
to security sector reform.73 There is a serious concern that SSR tends to
focus too heavily on capacity-building at the expense of addressing more
fundamental shortcomings, in particular the need to build up the integrity of
the security system.74 Such integrity-promoting measures include structural
reforms that discourage abuses (e.g. vetting, building institutional account-
ability, strengthening institutional independence, and advancing adequate
representation) and ensure that the security system is actually responsive
to and reflective of the communities it protects and operates within. But,
as preliminary analysis it is also clear that such criticism also suffers from
a lack of gender perspective and integration. Thus, the strategies that are
positively mooted to ensure reform of security sector reform themselves fail
to engage substantively or consistently with gender issues. 71
There is also an evident structural link between security sector reform
and dealing with the past. The failure or lack of this dimension seriously
73. These criticisms range from the observation that SSR constitutes a European center left
"project," to claims that it is devoid of meaning as it ignores the underlying causes of
insecurity in developing countries. "It has also been criticized for being too narrowly
married to an optimistic conception of the possibilities for external manipulation of
political and social forces and that in most formulations it leaves out the requirements
for major changes in the industrialized countries, such as an overhaul of their arms
export policies." Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security
Sector Reform 5 (Geneva Ctr. for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional
Paper No. 4, 2003).
74. Seegenerally Heiner Hinggi &Vincenza Scherrer, Towards an Integrated Security Sector
Reform Approach in UN Peace Operations, 15 INT'L PEACEKEEPING 486 (2008).
75. The priorities for security sector reform highlighted by BALL et al., supra note 51 include: 1)
Ensuring that security sector organizations, especially the security forces are accountable
both to elected authorities and to civil society and that they operate in accordance with
democratic principles and the rule of law; 2) Making information about security sector
budgeting and planning widely available, both within governments and to the public; 3)
Creating an environment in which civil society can actively monitor the security sector
and be consulted on a regular basis on defense policy, resource allocation and other
issues; 4) Strengthening civil society organizations and other NGO to play such roles;
5) Fostering an environment that promotes regional/sub-regional peace and security;
6) Giving adequate attention to specific legacies of war, such as practical disarmament
and demobilization. The clear sense of this agenda is the sense of a reformist impulse,
but one which critically fails to take account of its own biases and which in effect will
result in a conversation in which elite men will continue to talk to each other about
security and in which gender will inevitably be sidelined.
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undermines the extent to which security sector reform can be meaningful,
long-lived, and transformative. Therefore, there is a need to think about
security sector reform in the context of transitional institutional transforma-
tion.76 In particular, there is a need to think about how the gender failings
of past-focused accountability mechanisms have manifested themselves and
how these failings have influenced current understanding of what role the
past plays in security sector reform. 77
Another clear (but marginalized) critique of security sector reform is
directed at the unwillingness of national or international policy makers and
academics to address precisely "who are the individuals who should par-
ticipate in, take ownership of, and ultimately benefit from SSR." 78 Moreover,
even those who advocate a deep concept of security sector reform run the
risk of promoting lofty sounding platitudes without fundamentally engaging
with marginal voices.7 9 It is also useful to reflect on the use of language by
security sector reform insiders and the extent to which the terminology is
exclusionary and sidelines gender. The focus on the language of leadership,
control, containment of threats, and force assumes a particular understand-
ing of security sector reform and a predetermined conceptualization of who
the subjects of the discourse are. It should also be noted that the discourse
of security sector reform has a pervasive overlay of hetero-normativity that
pervades militarization, demilitarization, and security sector reform conversa-
tions.80 This overlay is particularly relevant as we assess how intersectionality
plays out in the security sector reform context and how problematic essen-
tialist responses to the absence of gender may be for women. 81
F. Locales and Representation
Finally this analysis highlights an obvious point-namely, that most of the
locales where security sector reform is discussed, decided, and implemented
are decision-making entities that have a history of poorly (or not) represent-
ing women.
76. LAURA DAVIS, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
(2009), available at http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Transitionaljustice_
andSecuritySystemReform.pdf.
77. See Ni Aolgin & Turner supra note 4.
78. See FARR, BERGHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MCMT., supra note 42, at 2.
79. Id. at 2.
80. See generally, Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen, Janet Halley & Tracy Higgins, Gen-
der, Sexuality, and Power-Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601
(2003).
81. See Eilish Rooney, Engendering Transitional Justice: Questions of Absence and Silence,
3 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT (2007) (exploring the application of intersectionality theory to the
exclusion of women from peace process negotiations).
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Representation constitutes a key element of re-gendering security in the
security sector reform context. It is relevant to mainstreaming, specialization,
and cross-cutting approaches to gender security. This stated, an important and
underlying caveat should be noted. Gender security will not be assured by
merely addressing the lack of women's representation in key security sector
reform sites. It would be an elementary mistake to confuse representation
with reform. UN Resolution 1325 "urges UN Member States to ensure in-
creased representation of women at all decision-making levels . . . for the
prevention, management, and resolution of conflict."82 It calls on govern-
ments to take a proactive position to promote the entry of women into the
security services.83 It also requires the presence of women in peace-making
negotiation teams. But presence raises numerous complex issues. As Eilish
Rooney questions in a related context, "For instance, which women should
be present? Would any woman be able to 'represent' women's interest? Are
'women's interests' different from men's interests? How so? . . . Can legal
formulation accord recognition to women's presence in this context?"84
Beyond the procedural package of issues raised by representation itself
lies the further step of ensuring that women are meaningfully represented in
decision-making positions and that there is a critical mass of women present
so that divergent women's voices can emerge."' This critical mass is essential
to deflect the real possibility that women will either be absorbed into the
status quo or marginalized. 86 A preliminary empirical assessment of women's
participation in negotiation processes premised on the requirements of Reso-
lution 1325 reports that women themselves have viewed their presence as
tokenistic and have become deeply disillusioned with their participation and
their influence on outcomes. 87 The challenge is manifold-requiring both
82. See also Women and Peace and Security, S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 6.
83. Id. A relevant reference point here is reform of the police services in Northern Ireland
negotiated as part of the Belfast Agreement, supra note 35. Such reform was mooted
as a means to ensure greater cross-community confidence in a police force that had a
significant history of human rights violations and was implicated in broader concerns
about the representative nature of the state and its institutions of governance. The
reform process was advanced by the establishment of an international commission to
review policing, the Patten Commission see THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
POUCING FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: A NEW BEGINNING (1999), available at http://www.nio.gov.
uk/a-new-beginning-in-plicing-in-nrthern-irelandpdf. While this report was viewed
as engaged with the broadest set of policing and security reform issues, it failed to pay
meaningful attention to gender issues and the highly masculine structure, organization
and membership of the police force in the jurisdiction.
84. See Rooney, supra note 81.
85. This requires consideration of the need for applying quotas to ensure women's repre-
sentation.
86. Donna Pankhurt wisely points out that the mere presence of women does not per se lead
to a change in attitudes in high "masculine" institutions and contexts. See Pankhurst,
Women, Gender, and Peacebuilding, supra note 70, at 12-13.
87. See Victoria Brittain, The Impact of War on Women, 44 RACE & CLASS 41-51 (2003).
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positive and diverse representation and further efforts to ensure a critical
mass is present and retained at the negotiation tables. Achieving this outcome
may require no less than fundamentally recalibrating the militaristic culture
that defines the entities that presently make up the sector.88
Consider also the multiple sites where representation itself must be
advanced. We can conceive of four key entities engaged in security sector
reform conversations:
" Governments
" Security Sector (including inter alia public militaries, non-governmental
militias and groupings, police, intelligence agencies, border guards, and
private entities providing state or private security)
" Local Stakeholders (including formally identified civil society groupings and
identifiable social, religious, ethnic, and other groups who lack organization
ability or formal recognition)
* External Partners (including international institutions, regional and multilateral
organizations, other states)
All of these locales are male-dominated, with a notable dearth of women
in key decision-making arenas. Engaging with gender security requires
transformation in all these sites to prevent the phenomena identified earlier
of patriarchies reinforcing one another in contexts that project as reform
processes. If one moves beyond the idea of simplistic representation based
merely on the idea that the presence of women (any women) constitutes
gender representation in the security sector reform context, then a plethora
of substantive institutional reform matters become present. These are relevant
to all four of the entities identified above. Such strategies mitigate against
the adoption of a specialized approach to gender security but emphasize
the comprehensive set of contexts in which mainstreaming and/or cross-
cutting approach operate. They include recruitment, promotion, and transfer
strategies; training agendas; discipline and grievance procedures; and axi-
omatically family-friendly working supports as well as legal protections to
entrench such advances. Fundamental issues of organizational culture and
subcultures arise in all four sites as male and macho sexism are arguably
endemic to these institutional structures. To underestimate the scale and
depth of transformation required is to fundamentally underestimate the bar-
riers that exist to meaningfully ensuring gender security, and ultimately to
the project of transitional justice itself.
88. An important general point to note here is that the while much energy is spent ensur-
ing that women are placed "at the table," little follow up is given to ensuring that they
remain. A key challenge is retaining a representative spectrum over the three stages
described by Bell, Women Address the Problems of Peace Agreements, supra note 32,
at 100-16.
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G. A New Paradigm of Gendered Security
In his review of the concept of security sector reform applied to developing
and transitional societies, Herbert Wulf has argued that the concept offers
the potential to be "excitingly broad in scope, since it should be undertaken
with the intent not only to disarm a society or reduce the size of its armed
forces, but to fundamentally change civilian-military relations by installing
democratic control over the security sector."89 This quotation to some extent
manifests a number of pitfalls evident in reformist and liberal approaches
to security sector reform. A re-gendering of security sector reform would
require that these "reformist" positions be as critically evaluated as their
conservative counterparts. This is because from a gender perspective reform
may constitute a euphemism for change that involves modification but not
transformation. This can be management-focused change90 or change that
is premised on outcomes that are highly traditional. In this context the term
"security-sector transformation" has been proposed as an alternative term that
is intended to convey the message that wide-ranging change in the security
sector is sought, rather than narrowly perceived security-sector reform.9 1
As highlighted above, it is important to think about how the modeling of
change onto western democratic notions of institutional structure may look
like positive change but in fact, these institutional structures are as deeply
patriarchal as their non-western counterparts. The institutional modeling then
may deliver change (or not) but in fact is premised on notions of institutional
functioning that are not at all focused on what women want or need.
A central issue theme across much of the literature in this domain is
the dominant narrative of masculinity pervading security sector reform poli-
cies and analysis. This meta-narrative is also linked to a pervasive emphasis
on what is deemed to constitute the core elements of the security sector.
Typically the emphasis on certain providers of security (military, police,
intelligence agencies, state security, paramilitary organizations, and border
guards) continues to emphasize the public providers of security and fails to
engage with the broader sites and causes of private violence experienced
by women. Moreover what is seen as progress in security sector parlance
may actually simply not respond in any way to the need for mainstreaming,
integrating, or cross-cutting gender into security sector reform analysis. Thus,
for example some contributions speak positively to the advances made by
89. As quoted in FARR, BERGHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., supra note
42.
90. For an analysis of this kind of paper change, see Mary O'Rawe, Human Rights and
Police Training in Transitional Societies: Exporting the Lessons from Northern Ireland,
27 HuM. RTS. Q. 943 (2005).
91. NEIL COOPER & MICHAEL PUGH, SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES 2002;
DAVID CHUTER, DEFENCE TRANSFORMATION: A SHORT GUIDE TO THE ISSUES (2000).
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integrating defense reform, police reform, and judicial sector reform under
an integrated umbrella-instigating "a holistic approach to the provision of
security, integrating all the relevant institutions and their connections"-but
gender or other marginal voices are not integrated in any way.9 2 From a
feminist perspective then security sector reform in this holistic model could
actually serve to perpetuate and extend structural patriarchies rather then
unpick and replace them.
In conclusion, and taking a lead from the International Center forTransi-
tional Justice's (ICTJ) analytical approach to truth commissions, it is valuable
to ask why we need to specifically pay attention to gender when engaging in
security sector reform? As the ICTJ's Report noted, this attention is required
because "dominant hierarchies will marginalize women's priorities, interests
and participation"; they will "render invisible the gendered patterns and
structures" that accompany (in this case) security sector reform. 3 Identifying
the pervasiveness of this invisibility for women highlights the likelihood of
substantial resistance to a transformative vision of security sector reform. As
Vanessa Farr notes, "those who wield power within violent and exclusionary
structures will [not] easily give it up." 94 It is also evident that strategies to
rectify such exclusion require broad and transformative approaches address-
ing the social reality of women's inequality and the violence that pervades
normality for many. Only when such broader contextualization become
part of the "fix" in step with micro schemes and strategies to transform the
security sector will gender security be effectively realized for women.
V. CONCLUSION
The narratives that emerge from the "women's sector" in many transitional
and post-conflict societies suggest that women have an expansive notion of
what and where transformation is required, and it is not limited to the public
domains that so often dominate peace agreements and transitional "deals"
between internal political factions. Gendered notions of accountability and
harms also manifest a clearly different conceptualization than the dominant
masculinity that overshadows the peace deals and transitionary mechanisms
that typically come to the fore at the end of conflict or following a period of
authoritarian government in transitional societies. Women experience both
the public and private aspects of dysfunctional societies, and articulate the
need to transform politics and practice in both contexts.
92. Quoting Brzoska, supra note 73, at 16.
93. NESIAH ET AL., supra note 48, at 43-44.
94. FARR, BERGHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., supra note 42, at 7.
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In conclusion, the lived experience of women in conflicted and post-
authoritarian societies suggests that the term "transition" has much more
territory to occupy that it has hitherto and that much work is needed to both
ground and empirically quantify this fundamental difference of conceptual-
ization. The starting point for such expansion is assessing and revisiting the
accountability and restructuring mechanisms that have come to be seen as
synonymous with transition, probing their biases and exclusions, and offer-
ing an alternative and inclusive vision of what meaningful accounting and
transformative institutional change might look like for women. From that
follows a hard-nosed examination of transitional processes more generally,
allied with a willingness to expand the narrow band of public transition(s) that
are viewed by many as transformative-yet consistently fail to take account
of broader gendered transformations necessary to genuine social revolutions
in societies experiencing profound political and social change.
